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Introduction
Traditional infectious disease threats like smallpox, 
plague, yellow fever, and cholera prevented nations from 
ensuring the stability and well-being of their populations 
for centuries. In some countries, such diseases contri-
buted to border conﬂ  icts and other disputes. Accordingly, 
these diseases have long been considered in the develop-
ment of international treaties. Early attempts to control 
them led to the actual development of public health 
programs in most countries. More recently, the global 
nuclear proliferation, bioterrorism, and emerging infec-
tions, such as new strains of inﬂ  uenza, human immuno-
deﬁ  ciency virus (HIV), and multi-drug resistant infec-
tions have further challenged national capacities to 
achieve and maintain global security [1].
Th  e purpose of this article will be to provide an 
overview of the global health security in the context of 
the development of the International Health Regulations 
(IHR). Topics to be covered include: milestones leading 
to the current version of the IHR, the critical elements of 
the functions of the IHR, and recent examples of IHR 
implementation to control the urban yellow fever 
outbreak in Paraguay in 2008 and the A/H1N1 inﬂ  uenza 
pandemic of 2009-2010.
IHR development milestones
For centuries, diseases such as “black death” and smallpox 
killed millions of people worldwide. It was not until the 
1700s that the ﬁ  rst eﬀ  ective public health intervention 
was implemented widely. Quarantine of persons with 
contagious disease in some well-managed situations had 
a dramatic eﬀ  ect on reducing disease transmission. Other 
grossly inadequate interventions, such as phlebotomy of 
patients or toxic spraying of neighborhoods, continued to 
be used in the face of scientiﬁ  c and public ignorance.
In 1950, smallpox, cholera, plague, and yellow fever 
continued to kill thousands of people worldwide. Most 
deaths occurred in the poorest countries. Wealthier 
countries fretted over the risk of importations and the 
risk of outbreaks in their national populations. Th  ese 
concerns led to the ﬁ  rst version of the IHR, drafted in 
1951, which was subsequently revised and strengthened 
in 1969. However, the new IHR did little to curb the 
persistence of international threats. For example, the last 
three polio outbreaks in the United States occurred in the 
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Public Health1970s, ultimately as a result of importations of wild 
poliovirus from the Indian sub-continent. By the next 
decade, the acquired immunodeﬁ  ciency syndrome (AIDS) 
pandemic had emerged to impose enormous challenges 
to global health security.
By 1990, in countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean the polio eradication initiative was well under-
way to achieve the eradication target [2]. However, the 
program was severely threatened by the emergence of a 
cholera epidemic in Peru in early 1991. Th  e epidemic 
spread rapidly and aﬀ  ected virtually every country in the 
Western Hemisphere. Interestingly, the island of 
Hispaniola was not aﬀ  ected. To control the epidemic, 
countries such as Colombia used polio vaccination cam-
paigns that included messages on safe water, hygiene, and 
sanitation, in order to prevent the spread of cholera. Th  e 
opportunity to interrupt cholera transmission was more 
fortuitously linked to the existing polio eradication 
program than to any planned procedures or intended 
inﬂ  uence of the IHR.
In 1994, Surat, India, was reported to have plague by the 
Ministry of Health of India [3]. A global alarm was 
sounded largely through the reporting done by the press. 
Despite debates about deﬁ  nitive occurrence of laboratory 
conﬁ  rmed cases in the initial phases of the outbreak and 
the appropriateness of certain interventions, airports were 
closed; travel was disrupted both nationally and globally; 
embassies were closed; and some embassies even sent 
their staﬀ    home to their respective countries. All this 
happened with a tremendous economic cost to the peoples 
and Government of India. Clearly, the IHR had little eﬀ  ect 
on preventing the rather rash actions taken.
Th   e next year Ebola erupted in Kitwit, Africa [4]. Th  e 
WHO spearheaded its ﬁ   rst global and coordinated 
response to such an emerging threat. Recognizing the 
inadequacies of the Surat experience, in May 1995 the 
WHO declared that the 1969 version of the IHR was 
obsolete and requested its revision. By the late 1990s, a 
new meningococcal bacteria strain (w135) emerged in 
West Africa. Building on the lessons learned from the 
ﬁ   rst Ebola response, the WHO organized the Global 
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN). Th  is 
global mechanism was immediately challenged to address 
major outbreaks like the re-emergence of the Ebola and 
Marburg virus threats in Africa at the beginning of the 
2000-2010 decade. Because most developing countries 
had little capacity to respond to threats nationally, the 
WHO at that time also established the National Epidemic 
Preparedness and Response team in their headquarters.
In 2003, the world was shocked again with the ﬁ  rst 
global pandemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) [5]. Th  e case-fatality ratio of SARS approached 
10%, and 20% of the cases were among health care 
workers. Although diﬃ     cult to quantify, the WHO 
estimated that the global cost of this pandemic probably 
ranged from USD 30-50 billion. Concerns over national 
capacity and the accountability of nations to report global 
threats led to the 2005 version of the IHR, known as 
IHR(2005), that is currently in use today.
Critical elements and functions of the IHR(2005)
Th  e purpose of IHR(2005) is “to prevent, to protect 
against, control, and provide a public health response to 
the international spread of disease in ways that are 
commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, 
and which avoid unnecessary interference with 
international traﬃ   c and trade” (Article 2) [6]. As such, 
major diﬀ   erences between the current version and 
previous versions include the following:
•  Shift from containment at the border to containment 
at the source of the event;
•  Shift from a rather small disease list (smallpox, plague, 
cholera, and yellow fever) required to be reported, to 
all public health risks, including chemical and radio 
nuclear threats; and
•  Shift from preset measures to tailored responses with 
more ﬂ  exibility to deal with the local situations on the 
ground and the advice of the emergency committee.
Th   e new IHR(2005) call for accountability. Account  ability 
in reporting critical events is inextricably linked to the 
national or local capacity to identify the etiology. 
Confusion over the diagnosis will delay reporting that 
will ultimately aﬀ  ect global health security, no matter 
how responsible and committed a particular nation is. 
Th  erefore, the IHR(2005) also call for strengthened 
national capacity for surveillance and control; prevention, 
alert, and response to international public health emer-
gen  cies beyond the traditional short list of required 
report  ing; global partnership and collaboration; and 
rights, obligations, accountability, and procedures of 
monitoring [6].
Th  e new IHR(2005) include a broad scope of work. 
Case deﬁ  nitions of diseases, public health emergency of 
international concern (PHEIC), and public health risks 
are intended to be more unambiguous with analytic tools 
to evaluate every potential public health risk of 
international concern. Additionally, biological, chemical, 
and radio nuclear etiologies are included and implicit. 
Collaboration with other mandated organizations is 
absolutely essential. At the country level, the IHR(2005) 
are supported by the designation of national IHR focal 
points. Each focal point is mandated to promote eﬃ   cient 
and accurate communications in emergencies; coordinate 
with existing mechanisms such as the WHO Country 
Representative, International Food Safety Authorities 
Network (INFOSAN), and Chem Alert; and prioritize 
national engagement and ownership. A key priority is to 
strengthen national capacity for surveillance and 
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important and a key element of the WHO strategy for 
global health security [6].
Mechanisms for advice and oversight of national 
capacity development are:
• National roster of experts that can be called upon 
immediately to deal with any crisis as it occurs;
•  Emergency committees to manage the response;
• Review committees to monitor progress and deﬁ  ne 
lessons learned from the way each event was managed 
so that corrective action can be taken for future events; 
and
• Global support through policy development at the 
World Health Assembly (WHA) and regional 
committees of the WHO.
Examples of recent challenges to the IHR(2005)
Yellow fever
For the ﬁ  rst time in more than 45 years in the Western 
Hemisphere, Paraguay reported an urban yellow fever 
outbreak in the peri-urban area its national capital, 
Asuncion, in 2008 [7]. Ten people died a few short weeks 
later. Annually, neighboring Brazil reports episodic 
jungle yellow fever, which is diﬀ  erent from the urban 
pattern. Jungle yellow fever occurs in tropical rainforest 
areas where wild mosquitoes, Haemagogus, can infect 
monkeys with yellow fever virus. Monkeys serve as the 
reservoir for other wild Haemagogus mosquitoes to 
become infected with the virus. Infected mosquitoes can 
transmit the yellow fever virus to humans who enter the 
rainforest. Human victims of jungle yellow fever infection 
are typically young males who work or hunt in the rain-
forest. Urban yellow fever occurs when domestic mos-
quitoes, Aedes aegypti, transmit the virus to humans [8]. 
Urban transmission is not dependent upon the monkey 
reservoir, so outbreaks can be explosive and cause 
substantial mortality quickly. In cases of urban trans-
mission, the case-fatality ratio approaches 40% [9].
In response to the urban yellow fever outbreak in 
Paraguay, the IHR(2005) were activated. Once notiﬁ  ed, 
the WHO in Geneva, the WHO Regional Oﬃ   ce for the 
Americas (known as the Pan American Health Organiza-
tion, or PAHO), and the Paraguayan Ministry of Health 
initiated emergency discussions to mobilize yellow fever 
vaccine from the global stockpile. In addition, PAHO 
deployed a team to provide technical cooperation to 
enhance surveillance, outbreak investigation, vector 
control, risk communication, and logistic operations. 
PAHO also helped mobilize laboratory expertise and 
critical reagents to conduct the investigative testing. 
Rapid coordination with the Ministry of Health was 
essential to the response.
Th   e global response to the urban yellow fever outbreak 
in Paraguay resulted in the rapid mobilization of yellow 
fever vaccines. Th  e PAHO Revolving Fund, created for 
the purchase and management of the supply of vaccines, 
played a critical role in mobilizing the vaccine from 
nations around the southern hemisphere. Th  e global 
stockpile of yellow fever vaccine had insuﬃ   cient number 
of vaccine doses to respond eﬀ  ectively to the crisis in 
Paraguay. As a result, eﬀ  orts of PAHO, in coordination 
with other PAHO Member States, led to vaccines being 
mobilized from national stockpiles of neighboring coun-
tries in the region for use in Paraguay. Paraguay was able 
to implement a timely and rapid vaccination response. 
Before the arrival of vaccines, civil disturbance was 
mounting in the face of public panic. Th   ese regional and 
global eﬀ  orts prevented many more deaths, as well as the 
potentially disastrous consequences of uncontrolled civil 
disturbance. Th   e political and technical collaboration led 
to improved global health because the outbreak was 
stopped, and also served to enhance political relations in 
the region. Th   ere were other global health consequences. 
Had the outbreak continued, Africa would have faced a 
serious threat due to insuﬃ   cient global vaccine supply to 
respond to potential outbreaks. Th  e  IHR(2005) 
mechanism put the world on alert and contributed to the 
resulting successful global response, but other national 
and regional capacities, such as the PAHO Revolving 
Fund, contributed substantially as well [7,10].
A/H1N1 infl  uenza
On April 18, 2009, the national IHR focal point of the 
United States notiﬁ  ed the WHO through the IHR(2005) 
mechanism of the detection of a new strain of A/H1N1 
inﬂ  uenza virus in two boys, one of whom had a travel 
history to Mexico [11]. Soon after, this alert led to the 
detection of the same virus in Mexico, where an outbreak 
of severe respiratory illness had been evolving for some 
weeks. Th  e  ﬁ  rst IHR(2005) Emergency Committee meet-
ing was convened on April 25, a Saturday. As a result, the 
WHO declared a public health emergency of inter-
national concern. On June 11, the Director General of the 
WHO, Dr. Margaret Chan, declared inﬂ  uenza pandemic 
phase 6. By August 2010, over a year later, she announced 
that the pandemic had subsided.
During its course, the A/H1N1 inﬂ  uenza  pandemic 
killed over 18,000 people and infected thousands of 
people across the globe in virtually every country on the 
planet. Th  e global alert and response to this pandemic 
has been described above. Th  e WHO, partners, and 
countries around the world activated their emergency 
operations centers, initiating disease detection, reporting, 
and extensive investigations. Laboratory reagents and 
supplies, technical experts, antiviral medications, and 
other protective equipment were deployed to countries 
in need. In the ﬁ  rst month of the PHEIC declaration, 
PAHO supported the installation of the pandemic H1N1 
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unprecedented demonstration of international coopera-
tion. Later, a global response coordinated vaccine distri-
bution when vaccines became available. Fortunately, the 
outbreak was not as severe as many predicted, but even 
so, many pregnant women died. Mortality as a result of 
the pandemic, in fact, still needs to be evaluated more 
accurately. Many experts concluded that the response 
was necessary. If the pandemic had been more severe, the 
consequences would have been enormous. Without the 
previous work on preparedness, advance work on 
antiviral stocks, and written plans for global coordination 
through IHR mechanisms, great loss of life and chaos 
would surely have ensued. Most experts would conclude 
that the technical cooperation provided to the pandemic 
control was unprecedented and very appropriate.
Conclusions
Th   e global public health community has unprecedented 
support to respond to global pandemics and public 
health emergencies of international concern. Eﬀ  orts to 
strengthen national capacity to respond are essential and 
must continue well into the future. Th   e IHR(2005) focus 
on accountability and capacity development has proven 
to be essential in the response to emergencies. In the 
Americas, other measures like the PAHO Revolving Fund 
for vaccine mobilization and purchase have also been 
critical. Ultimately, adherence to accountable and timely 
reporting of PHEIC and the national capacity to respond 
to such crises will prevent disruptions in the global health 
security and loss of life.
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